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BETWEEN RIGHTS AND RITES: THE
IRONIES OF CRISIS AND CONTRACT
JEFFREY M. LIPSHAW*
I
INTRODUCTION
Is contract in crisis? Other co-contributors’ worthy responses to the question
largely fall into two camps, both inspired by COVID-related dislocation. Some
focus on prototypical conundrums of contract law doctrine like impracticability
or frustration of purpose. There the fundamental question is whether, on one
hand, the post-contracting events eviscerated either the means or the logic of
performance or, on the other, the contract, expressly or impliedly, allocated the
risk of those events. Other co-contributors contemplate the institution of contract
law itself, say, how standard contract provisions evolve to reflect circumstances,
how the institution adapts to relationships rather than mere transactions, or how
the institution fosters unfairness or injustice.
Like others since mid-March 2020, I have observed instances of particular
contracts in crisis and therefore am amenable to the doctrinal tools for excusing
performance. My son and daughter-in-law had the paradigmatic problem: a large
wedding party scheduled for June 2020 for which they executed contracts with a
venue and caterer and had remitted deposits totaling $15,000. Contracts that no
longer map well on the parties’ expectations as of the time of execution might
themselves be in crisis, and the doctrines of impracticability and frustration (and
associated risk allocation) could, during potential litigation, determine whether
any of the parties’ obligations survived. This Essay is less concerned with
doctrinal conundrums engendered by the pandemic than what the author
perceives as a crisis of reification of entitlements in rights (including contract).
That crisis is far less about elements of doctrine than it is of morality; less about
the enforcement of rights and more about the holders’ willingness to set them
aside. During crisis, tunnel-visioned and slavish devotion to abstract contract
rights may well be a culprit, not a hero.
What some call “contract in crisis” is thus an opportunity to reflect on the
limits of contract law as a formal institution, rather than delving into the efficacy
of its constituent doctrines or even how those doctrines might evolve or adapt.
Copyright © 2022 by Jeffrey M. Lipshaw.
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The thesis, in a nutshell, is that in my non-lawyer incarnations—businessman,
parent, husband—being right and having rights were not all they were cracked
up to be. In contrast, the core of law and lawyering is the articulation and
vindication of rights. Hence, my prior work has explored the intersection of rights
and customs in those circumstances in which someone might hold a right but, for
reasons of moral compunction, common sense, decency, being a mensch, or some
other ought, chooses not to assert the right.1
A world wholly governed by rights would be like a machine whose metal parts
grind on other metal parts, with no metaphoric grease supplied by things like
trust, deference, or discretion. Contract rights are simply a subset of that concern.
And times of crisis test, or at least highlight, the tension between the grinding
metal of rights assertion and the grease of non-legal oughts. The pandemic
examples include mask wearing, access to vaccines, and refusals to be vaccinated,
but there are other examples of that tension in mundane and critical
circumstances, including parking one’s car on the street during a snowstorm,
queuing at the Department of Motor Vehicles, or receiving compensation as a
bank executive during a meltdown of the global financial system. Part II thus
explores the extent to which individuals are inclined in modern life to think of
entitlements and relationships as rights rather than social obligations, customs,
or courtesies. Some are clearly the subject of legal rights, some clearly not, but
category boundaries as between rights and courtesies are not crisply binary. It is
not a given that the operative norm is legal rather than social. What is clear is
that thinking in terms of rights may extend beyond artifacts of positive law and
its enforcement institutions; there is a gray area of expectations that might once
have been based in family or community norms and values, but which now might
fairly be seen as based in rights.
Part III suggests the use of rights to justify everyday expectations is, in reality,
less about modernity, rationality, and efficiency than it is simply a different kind
of active faith. Such active faith is not unlike resort to the rites of traditional
religion and is as fraught with fundamentalism, apostasy, and heresy as the latter.
When parties justify behavior, like refusals to wear masks or take a vaccine, by
way of rights, they are not usually appealing to a coherent corpus dispensing
universal justice. Rather, these parties are more often instrumentally, as
weaponized reason, invoking an authoritative source, a divinity of legal
conceptions rather than gods. Part IV proposes the irony that rights are, often as
not, a thin and perhaps fragile veneer enveloping and mediating our desires. The
attribution of rights to entitlements is not as much about modern rationality,
reason, and justice as it is rather a thinly veiled power grab, an atavistic holdover
from the state of nature in which might determines possession. Whether people
justify their behavior by way of God-given rights, on one hand, or the rights of
positive law, on the other, the gray area between the extremes of law and custom
gets infused with rights-based vindications of behavior rather than common
1. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Freedom, Compulsion, Compliance and Mystery: Reflections on the
Duty Not to Enforce a Promise, 3 LAW CULTURE & HUM. 82 (2007).
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sense, decency, or being a mensch.
The normative take-away is not that rights (including contract rights) do not
matter. They do. But wise leadership (indeed, wise living) is about continuing to
ask, over and over, whether the rights people think they hold are worth asserting.
II
MODERN CHARACTERIZATIONS OF ENTITLEMENTS AS RIGHTS
Thirty years ago, Mary Ann Glendon famously decried the strident and
absolutist rights rhetoric that had come to characterize American political
discourse, and which had fouled “the processes of public justification,
communication, and deliberation upon which the continuing vitality of a
democratic regime depends.”2 She focused primarily on rights issues at the
constitutional level—privacy, abortion, gay rights, and so on. She observed,
however, that rights talk was perhaps less prevalent in family and community
environments, and “that cooperative, relational, patterns of living survive in the
United States to a greater degree than our individualistic public rhetoric would
suggest.”3 Indeed, the cooperative and relational patterns of co-existence
Glendon observed persist; however, as with political rights talk, people are now
inclined to think of the entitlements and relationships of daily life in terms of
rights rather than social obligations, customs, or courtesies. And, once people
think about something as a right, it takes some substantial inertia to return to
thinking about it as a matter of social obligation, custom, or courtesy.
Nevertheless, even in the most sophisticated transactions, contract rights exist
(even if not acted upon explicitly) concurrently with non-legal social norms and
community values.4
Hence, what distinguishes legal rights, like contract rights, from mere social
obligations, customs, or courtesies? There is an implicit taxonomy at work. The
very question suggests an ability to establish a rule or definition that allows the
analyst to place the practice in one category or another. There are circumstances
in which one needs to establish whether a particular concept falls within the
bucket of “law” or “custom,” but legal and philosophical efforts to answer those
questions in binary fashion oversimplify the problem. For example, it may be
necessary for a court in a First Amendment case to determine whether a practice
is or is not the exercise of religion. Nevertheless, classifying a particular set of
beliefs as religious or secular does resist binary resolution.5
2. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 171
(1991). Another law professor has recently taken up the problem of rights talk. See JAMAL GREENE,
HOW RIGHTS WENT WRONG: WHY OUR OBSESSION WITH RIGHTS IS TEARING AMERICA APART
(2021) (proposing a return to America’s original vision of rights in the hands of legislatures and juries,
rather than judges).
3. GLENDON, supra note 2, at 174.
4. Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Metaphors, Models, and Meaning in Contract Law, 116 PENN ST. L. REV.
987, 1011–13, 1039–42 (2012).
5. See Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Can There Be a Religion of Reasons? A Response to Leiter’s Circular
Conception of Religion, 26 J. L. & RELIGION 43 (2010) (commenting on Brian Leiter’s definition of
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The effort to define the conceptual bucket of legal norms as distinct from
moral norms is itself a mainstay of academic jurisprudence reflected in the work
of John Austin, Hans Kelsen, H.L.A. Hart, Lon Fuller, Ronald Dworkin, and
others. That jurisprudential taxonomy is difficult when it comes to contract law.
Little in its practice or adjudication fits Austin’s fairly primitive conception of law
as commands of the sovereign.6 Perhaps one can discern Kelsen’s Basic Norms
or Hart’s rules of recognition and internal point of view at work, but that means
focusing on consideration doctrine, the traditional bane of first-year law
students.7 The question here is broader: When it comes to what otherwise might
be moral or social obligations, why do people resort to contract law at all?
Social scientists likely have as much trouble as legal philosophers in cabining
off the institution of contract law, but their work allows one to explore the nature
of the demarcation (if any) itself. Susan Silbey’s seminal work identifies social
practices that are otherwise removed from legal institutions yet which “enact and
display deep-seated and relatively systematic conceptions of law and legality.”8
For instance, Silbey examined the use of space-savers in northern U.S. cities as a
means of retaining a street parking place that one has shoveled out after a
snowstorm. Her project is to analyze culture “not as an experimental science in
search of law but as an interpretive one in search of meaning.”9 Hence, she finds
legal meaning in the artifacts of space saving—chairs, milk crates, tables, dead
plants, traffic cones, and a bust of Elvis Presley (among myriad others) along with
the narratives of those who engage in space saving.10 In her view, the participants
in this system of “dibs” justify what they are doing not primarily with reference
to efficiency or spontaneous order, as at least one economist has suggested, “but
to longstanding associations between work and space, i.e. property and law.”11
Silbey distinguishes her cultural interpretation from Robert Ellickson’s
economic thesis that non-legal social norms operate in place of law.12 Instead, she
employs insights from anthropology and sociology to demonstrate that those
social norms often cannot be understood without reference to legal norms, and
vice versa. Silbey’s understanding reflects something Austin Sarat and Thomas
Kearns characterized as the legal-sociological “great divide.” That is, the fault
line separating “instrumentalists” who sharply distinguish legal standards and
nonlegal human activity and “constitutivists” (akin to Silbey’s views) who see
religion and argument that there is no principled reason for the Constitution to single out religion for
special tolerance).
6. Brian Bix, John Austin, STAN. ENCYCL. PHIL. § 3 (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2022),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/austin-john/ [https://perma.cc/95R7-X698].
7. HANS KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY 58 (Bonnie
Litschewski Paulson and Stanley L. Paulson trans., 1996); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 56–57
(Jacob T. Levy ed., 2d ed. 1997).
8. Susan S. Silbey, J. Locke, op cit.: Invocations of Law on Snowy Streets, 5 J. COMP. L. 66, 68
(2010).
9. Id. at 69 (quoting CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (1973)).
10. Id. at 70–74.
11. Id. at 89.
12. Id. at 89 n.116.
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legal meaning as so infused into practices, consciously or not, such that social life
is “run through with law.”13
Silbey and Ellickson are both assessing practices and justifications that have
family resemblances to prototypical legal norms (that is, those most everyone
would accept as legal, and which Silbey described as “active and coercive,
involving professional mobilization and discourse”)14 and those social norms that
may operate along with or in place of prototypical legal norms. They are both
assessing norms and practices through our Enlightenment-tinted glasses. Silbey
invokes Locke to interpret expressions akin to “I didn’t shovel out that spot so
that you could park your shitbox in it you fucking dickhead,”15 as property claims
arising theoretically from desert (“I worked to create this spot so I own it”),16
possession/notice (“This is my space and you should know that from the Elvis
bust I left there”),17 or community consent.18 The models used by Ellickson (and
law and economic scholarships generally) are philosophically consequentialist,
and if they do not derive directly from the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and
John Stuart Mill, they are similar enough in approach to be thought of as
utilitarian.19
The common dilemma among law, economics, sociology, and anthropology is
interpreting practices sitting in a taxonomic gray area—that is, those practices
featuring characteristics of prototypical custom and characteristics of
prototypical law (under any jurisprudential conception) but being neither fish nor
fowl. At the margins, it may be hard to tell whether the subject of the observation
should be classified as a fish or a bird, but that does not delegitimize the idea that
there is a difference between fish and birds. What is less important within that
gray area, per Sarat and Kearns, is locating the precise demarcation between
rights reified in formal law and social norms that take on cultural meaning akin
to rights.20
Take the social practice of queuing. When we lived in Indiana, I needed to
renew my driver’s license at the Bureau of Motor Vehicles. It was the stereotype
of those offices to walk in, take a number, see from the display above the clerks
that there were fifty people ahead of you, and settle in for an hour’s wait. To
avoid that, I showed up at the office in the mall on 86th Street at 7:30 a.m., thirty
minutes before it opened. I was the first, but not the only one with the same idea.
By 7:50 a.m., there were perhaps thirty people in line. At about 7:55 p.m., a young
13. Austin Sarat & Thomas Kearns, Beyond the Great Divide: Forms of Legal Scholarship and
Everyday Life, in LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE 21, 21–23 (Austin Sarat & Thomas Kearns, eds., 1995).
14. Silbey, supra note 8, at 89 n.116.
15. Id. at 80.
16. Id. at 73.
17. Id. at 75.
18. Id. at 84.
19. Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEG. STUD. 103, 104–05
(1979); H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble
Dream, 11 GA. L. REV. 969, 987–88 (1977).
20. Sarat & Kearns, supra note 13, at 56.
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man walked up to the door, obviously hovering to jump the line. I did not say
anything, but several people right behind me did. They asked, “What do you
think you are doing?” “I’m in a hurry and I need to get in quickly,” he responded.
“Well, you can get in line like everybody else.” He continued just to stand there.
The tension, indeed, the threat of violence, was palpable. The pandemic analog
is vaccine line-jumping, an issue that has since faded but was a hot topic in the
first months after the COVID vaccines appeared.21
Queuing is a practice in which modern norms have developed but without law
or, as Silbey has suggested for parking space savers, the inference of legal norms
by scholars who have studied it.22 David Fagundes describes queuing as a social
institution as another example of Ellickson’s “order without law”; one that “arose
and persists in the absence of any legally imposed behavioral requirements or
threats of state sanction” but is nevertheless a “complex but stable series of social
norms.”23 There are aspects of the norm that resemble law—for example, that
“[d]eparting the line means you immediately forfeit your priority, just as
abandoning your property means you have relinquished legal ownership of it.”24
Silbey is not wrong to see something lawlike in what the parking space savers are
doing. Yet at the prototypical extremes, there is a distinction between norms that
are legal and those that are not, even if their definitional efforts falter at the
margins.25
That rich gray area between prototypical law and prototypical custom invites
a skeptical response: when participants justify behaviors by way of rights or law,
they are often simply coating ancient desires and impulses with modern veneer.
One of the grand theories of nascent sociology was Ferdinand Tönnies’s attempt
to trace changes over time from traditional communities (Gemeinschaft) to the

21. Shamus Khan, How Rich People Will Cut the Line for the Coronavirus Vaccine, WASH. POST
(Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/coronavirus-vaccine-richpeople/2020/12/18/3a2f188e-40ae-11eb-8bc0-ae155bee4aff_story.html [https://perma.cc/L85Q-4UHD];
Stephen L. Carter, Maybe Vaccine Line-Jumping Isn’t So Bad, THE QUINT (Mar. 17, 2021),
https://www.bloombergquint.com/gadfly/is-it-ok-to-jump-the-covid-vaccine-line-the-answer-is-changing
[https://perma.cc/888D-GQRG].
22. See, e.g., Leon Mann, Queue Culture: The Waiting Line as a Social System, 75 AM. J. SOC. 340
(1969) (exploring the formal and informal arrangements made in queues to regulate behavior).
23. David Fagundes, The Social Norms of Waiting in Line, 42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1179, 1181
(2017).
24. Id. at 1183 (citing William Hansen, Step in Line! The Etiquette of Queuing, ENG. MANNER (Jan.
11, 2010)).
25. See Diana Piana, Emilia Schijman & Noé Wagener, Where is the Law Living? Juridicity and
Methods of Research in the Works of Susan Silbey, 100 DROIT ET SOCIÉTÉ 645, 654 (regarding Silbey’s
thesis, “that body of work makes old questions resurface: how to seize legality in its deeply plural and
also situated nature, compared to other normativities which unfold and concern morality, morals,
aesthetics, ideology, etc.? How, yet, not to get everything muddled, to the point of losing the irreducible
specificity of law (the criticisms of Kelsen keep all their relevance)?”). Indeed, “to examine law
uncoupled from legal institutions,” Ewick and Silbey necessarily acknowledged there is a difference
between prototypical positive law, on one hand, and legal culture or consciousness, on the other. The
latter is what they called “legality” rather than law. PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON
PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE 22–23 (1998).
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impersonal structures of modern civil society (Gesellschaft).26 It is easy to mistake
the “Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft” thesis for a purely historical account rather
than an assessment of social forms and attitudes that have always co-existed,
albeit more or less at any given time.27 Gemeinschaft is the model of rural or
village life, “based essentially on concord, on the fundamental harmony of wills,
and is developed and cultivated by religion and custom.”28 It is “a living organism
in its own right,” the kind of society in which social norms prevail.29 In contrast,
Gesellschaft is the model of modern urbanized institutions, “based on convention,
on a convergence or pooling of rational desires; it is guaranteed and protected by
political legislation, while its policies and their ratification are derived from
public opinion.”30 It is a “mechanical aggregate and artefact,” a society of laws
and rights.31 The mistaken historicity is seeing the progression from Gemeinschaft
toward Gesellschaft as somehow wholly eradicating social norms and customs in
favor of rules and rights. The better view, indeed, Tönnies’s own, was to see “the
dichotomies he had identified were not time-specific or mutually exclusive, and
that contrasting types of institution––and contrasting attributes within a single
institution––would always co-exist in any historical setting.”32
There is an arc of modernization and mechanization, even in queuing. When
I was an undergraduate at the University of Michigan in the early 1970s, students
earned their entitlement to the best football and basketball tickets by lining up at
the ticket office, usually overnight in tents, sometimes for several days. That
system has since been replaced by online platforms that use algorithms rather
than physical effort to determine priorities. The more the systems are
mechanized, the more they will be amenable to the imputation of legal rights
exclusively, and the less the subject of social norms. Nevertheless, the
modernization of queuing is an arc and not a watershed. There are Gesellschaft
institutions like the queuing systems of sophisticated operations analysis.
Simultaneously, Gemeinschaft norms and attitudes surface in everyday
encounters like hailing a taxi on a New York City street in the rain or the palpable
angst people collectively experienced in the first quarter of 2021 about getting
two doses of the Pfizer or Moderna vaccine.
The same ahistorical nuances of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft hold for the
concurrent operation of social norms and legal rights in business. Most of the
legal scholarship trying to explain or justify the institution of contract law turns
ultimately to consequentialist theories of welfare or wealth maximization, on one
26. FERDINAND TÖNNIES, COMMUNITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY (Jose Harris ed., Jose Harris &
Margaret Hollis trans., 2001) (1887).
27. See id. at 258 (noting that Gemeinschaft continues to exist and define social reality in the era of
Gesellschaft).
28. Id. at 247.
29. Id. at 19.
30. Id. at 247.
31. Id. at 19.
32. Jose Harris, General Introduction, in COMMUNITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY xxviii (Jose Harris ed.,
Jose Harris & Margaret Hollis trans., 2001).
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hand, or deontological philosophies of promise and commitment on the other. In
each case, however, the focus is on the enforcement (or not) of the rights of the
contracting parties. Law professors, writing in thought experiments, rarely dwell
on those circumstances when somebody has a contract right but sees a good
reason not to act on it. But it happens in the real world. Stewart Macaulay
introduced a new school of contract law scholarship and teaching with a
surprising empirical observation and academic conclusion that “business
successfully operate[d] exchange relationships with relatively so little attention
to detailed planning or to legal sanctions.”33 Lisa Bernstein observed the
cooperative contracting arrangements among southern cotton brokers, one
aspect of which might be to set aside contract entitlements when good business
sense so dictated.34 As she noted, the stability of the system might be due “to the
fact that social norms of honor, particularly when reinforced through group
activity and a basic human desire to think of one’s self as trustworthy, are more
powerful motivators of transactional behavior than economic models of behavior
typically assume.”35 In short, the business world is one in which the legal
institutions of contract and corporate law operate either as backstops to, or in
parallel with, other social systems.36
But an extra-legal imperative not to enforce contract rights goes beyond socalled “relational contracts.”37 That usually means that businesspeople forego
short-term contract entitlements to preserve long-term profitable relationships.
In a 1985 article, Ian MacNeil invited theoreticians from diverse schools of
thought to weigh in on relational contracting. He described his own theory of
contract as one “encompass[ing] all relations among people in the course of
exchanging and projecting exchange into the future.”38 In particular, MacNeil
described variants of behavioral elements “as they occur in a spectrum of
exchange behavior from extreme discreteness to extremely relational patterns.”39
That theory still reflects a utilitarian calculation, discounting the present in favor
of the future, as opposed to a social norm of something like honor or the right
thing to do.

33. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC.
REV. 55, 62 (1963).
34. See Lisa E. Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation
through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1754–56 (2001) (explaining that due to
cotton industry realities, contractors strongly expect performance, but rely on renegotiation, nonlegal
sanctions and market-based damages if breach occurs).
35. Id. at 1787.
36. See generally Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Contract Formalism, Scientism, and the M-Word: A Comment
on Professor Movsesian’s Under-Theorization Thesis, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 23 (2006); Lipshaw, supra
note 4; Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Objectivity and Subjectivity in Contract Law: A Copernican Response to
Professor Shiffrin, 21 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 399 (2008) (exploring how social norms, including concepts of
morality, interact with contract law).
37. See generally Ian R. MacNeil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 WIS.
L. REV. 483 (1985) (discussing the development of scholarship concerning relational contract).
38. Id. at 523.
39. Id. at 524.
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Why might businesspeople and others forego a present contract right even in
a one-off circumstance? Roy Kreitner generously capsuled the view that
underpins this essay:
Lipshaw posits a genuine metaphysical problem (possibly an aporia) as one that
contract theory should grapple with: there is no simple way for incompatible norms to
be binding at the same time, and yet this dual binding-ness [sic] is a central and even
routine feature of the life of contract for both sophisticated and unsophisticated
contracting parties. Contract theory that ignores this normative plurality is missing
something central about the contracting experience, and more generally about the
experience of being bound by law.40

People sometimes may forego legal rights for reasons having nothing to do with
calculations of economic gain or loss, but because foregoing the rights is the
decent or honorable thing to do. For example, some years ago, my wife and I
owned a little house that we rented to a young couple on a year-long lease.
Midyear, they asked to be released from the contract because they were having
another baby and the house was too small. We let them out because it seemed
like the right thing to do, apart from any legal consideration, and there was no
future continuing relationship to preserve. On the other hand, it was not much of
a crisis. We did not need the money, nor did we have any interest in the costs,
financial or psychological, of enforcing the contract.
The upshot is the more one thinks the rights established by contract law
matter, the more likely one may be inclined to think the institution is in crisis
when those rights are tested by circumstance. Perhaps my wife and I would have
acted differently if we desperately needed the rental income. But to consider
rights in crisis without, at the same time, assessing co-existing social norms,
including those having nothing at all to do with the possibility of future gain, is
misguided. When it comes to getting along with each other, we can walk and chew
gum.
III
TURNING RIGHTS INTO RITES
Cloaking your sense of entitlement in an abstract right rather than a social
norm certainly falls on the Gesellschaft rights end of the continuum. Whether one
is talking about utility in economics to measure something abstract and universal
about happiness or discussing rights in law to capture something abstract and
universal about particular expectations, both are concepts capable of articulation,
systemization, reduction, measurement, codification, or the myriad other
instrumental uses to which we put good ideas. But there is irony in the manner
by which those very abstractions engender dogma more consistent with the
traditional Gemeinschaft norms. In short, in modern parlance, rights take on a
kind of secular divinity, even when the purported rights are quotidian, as in
contract. Indeed, on May 26, 2021, my Westlaw search of the database “All state
and federal cases” for “sanctity /s contract” (that is, the word “sanctity”
40. Roy Kreitner, On the New Pluralism in Contract Theory, 45 SUFFOLK L. REV. 915, 921 (2012).
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appearing in the same sentence as the word “contract”) produced 907 results. The
same search in the “Law Reviews & Journals” database produced 1,345 results.
There is a rich philosophical literature assessing rights talk, particularly the
sense that a right is something real.41 Legal positivists like Kelsen, Hart, and Raz
treated legal rights as normative claims, even if they are conceptually distinct
from purely moral expectations.42 The legal realists were more dismissive of any
imputation of metaphysics. American legal realists viewed rights as no more than
predictions of what legal officials would do.43 Scandinavian legal realists were
skeptical as well. Alf Ross, in the logical positivist tradition, dismissed the
concept of a right as metaphysical and, to that extent, meaningless.44 Karl
Olivecrona wanted to dispense with the concept of a right as some kind of
metaphysical force, and instead have it viewed as a real but abstract medium like
currency or performative sentences (“With this ring, I thee wed”).45 In assessing
all of this rights talk, Brian Bix has wisely cautioned philosophers to be
circumspect in denying the reality of rights, particularly when, in practice, a right
may well be a reason for action and therefore hardly something mystical,
mythical, or metaphysical.46 Or, as Susan Silbey observed, “law is a construct of
human ingenuity; laws are material phenomena . . . . People’s ordinary
transactions presume an objective world of facts ‘out there,’ yet close analysis of
the ways people apprehend that world reveals their own collaborative social
construction of those social facts.”47 In short, this inquiry is not about the
metaphysics of rights; rather, it is about a social construction in which belief in
and the assertion of modern rights takes on the aura of religious fervor.
Two particular reactions to crises of the twenty-first century demonstrate the
irony of a culture in which many expectations—such as freedom of speech or
religion, ownership of a gun, executive compensation—get expressed in rights
talk. In his recent memoir, Barack Obama recounted a meeting he convened in
February 2009 with chief executive officers of banks and financial institutions.
The news had broken that American International Group (AIG), whose London
office had issued the credit default insurance supporting the practice of subprime
mortgage securitization, was paying its employees $165 million in contractually
obligated bonuses. Despite the unseemliness of these payments in light of AIG’s
receipt of over $170 billion in Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) funds,
AIG’s chief executive officer told Timothy Geithner, the Treasury Secretary, that
AIG’s lawyer had advised “that any attempt to withhold the payments would
likely result in successful lawsuits by the AIG employees and damage payments

41. See generally Brian H. Bix, Ross and Olivecrona on Rights, 34 AUSTL. J. LEG. PHIL. 103 (2009)
(discussing legal realist views on the abstract and metaphysical nature of legal rights).
42. Id. at 105.
43. Id. at 110.
44. Id. at 104.
45. Id. at 107, 110.
46. Id. at 116.
47. Silbey, supra note 88, at 327.
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coming in at three times the original amount.”48 The Oval Office discussion
centered on the tension between contract rights and moral obligations. Lawrence
Summers, the Director of the National Economic Council, and Geithner
acknowledged the problem but thought the government forcing a violation of
private contract rights would damage the market system. Robert Gibbs, the press
secretary, argued that morality and common sense should prevail over the
contract entitlements.49 Obama called a meeting of bank and financial institution
executives to effectively jawbone them into exercising restraint in the face of
widespread public outrage. His reaction to their resistance mirrors my own
experience when dealing with rich contractual entitlements that conflict with
what otherwise seems like the right thing to do. People who believe in their
abstract rights, like executive compensation, can easily justify how they earned
them and are loathe to give them up.50
Such justifications and rationalizations are instances of seeing one’s
indisputably legal right as equivalent to, or at least as important as, conflicting
moral imperatives. The example par excellence (as Mary Ann Glendon might
have predicted in her criticism of modern political dialogue) has come to
dominate much of the discourse of the pandemic: the cloaking in rights talk of
objections to wearing a mask or being vaccinated to limit the spread of the
COVID-19 virus (including the Delta variant in the summer of 2021). Wearing a
mask is really little more than a social courtesy, a demonstration of concern for
other people, including those who might be at risk. Two Canadian researchers
undertook a study of attitudes underlying mask resistance.51 Based on survey
results, they found that people who did not wear masks were most likely to report
that they did not like being forced to do so; they thought masks were ineffective,
possibly harmful, or had adverse interpersonal effects; they felt masks were
unappealing aesthetically; and they believed wearing them to be an inconvenient
habit to acquire.52 But the mask resistance was not just personal. As in the flu
pandemic of 1918, mask resistance was also organized and political, in the form
of protest rallies.53 The researchers observed that “[d]espite the range of antimask attitudes, a common theme running through these reports is that protestors
believe that mandatory masks are a violation of civil rights.”54 Indeed, it is beyond
48. BARACK OBAMA, A PROMISED LAND 294–95 (2020).
49. Id. at 295.
50. See id. at 296–97 (revealing that after the financial crisis, executives believed reducing their own
compensation packages was a sufficient sacrifice and additional government action was unnecessary).
51. Steven Taylor & Gordon J.G. Asmundson, Negative Attitudes About Facemasks During the
COVID-19 Pandemic: The Dual Importance of Perceived Ineffectiveness and Psychological Reactance, 16
PLOS ONE e0246317, at 1 (Feb. 17, 2021),
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0246317 [https://perma.cc/7GQ3CZE3].
52. Id. at 7.
53. Id. at 2. See also Christine Hauser, The Mask Slackers of 1918, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/03/us/mask-protests-1918.html [https://perma.cc/2YYP-ZDWN]
(discussing cultural and political backlash to mask requirements during the 1918 influenza pandemic).
54. Taylor & Asmundson, supra note 51, at 3.
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dispute that mask wearing and vaccination during the COVID-19 pandemic has
often been a statement about political, constitutional, and religious rights.55
Rights are, as often as not, the Gesellschaft substitute for Gemeinschaft rites.
In other words, rights talk has often replaced what in the past would have been
considered a social or religious obligation. And lawyering in the belief that the
outcome of the legal argument is “true” is as close to ritual or dogmatic
justification as one can otherwise encounter in modern life. This is not the place
for reiteration of the extensive debates about whether there is objective
judgment-independent truth in law or even legal “facts” that go beyond the
trivial.56 Immanuel Kant held the view that humans can reason their way to moral
beliefs and conclusions that are correct enough to be thought of as true. Yet
reasoning one’s way to moral truth also leads to what Kant called “transcendental
illusion”: the mistaking of belief engendered by pure reason for empirical
knowledge.57 But as applied to the human institution of law and the articulation
of rights within it, Connie Rosati captured the correctly skeptical concern that
“law is something we make, and the conventional origins of law seem terribly at
odds with the idea that legal facts are utterly independent of our beliefs,
judgments, attitudes, or reactions concerning what the law is.”58 To the contrary,
what makes something legally true in easy cases is socially conventional and
jurisprudentially trivial. With all due respect to Ronald Dworkin and his theory
of legal interpretivism, there is little objective truth, if any, realizable in the
resolution of hard cases.59 Rather, as Brian Bix observes, “there are right answers
for most legal disputes, but for a significant number of legal questions (in this, or
any other, legal system) there may be no right answer, no legal truth.”60
But the common view that there are indeed objective legal truths accessible
by reason, existing independent of one’s own judgment,61 is enough to make the
case that rights talk derives as much from Gemeinschaft ritual as Gesellschaft
reason, even in 2022. Against skepticism about knowable truth about legal rights,
one may juxtapose the idea that legal argumentation, while capable even of
expression in first-order predicate logic, is nevertheless authoritarian in nature

55. Amanda Hess, The Medical Mask Becomes a Protest Symbol, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/02/arts/virus-mask-trump.html [https://perma.cc/XS72-TBS7]; Teo
Armus, Brooklyn’s Orthodox Jews Burn Masks in Violent Protests as New York Cracks Down on Rising
Coronavirus Cases, WASH. POST (Oct. 8, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/10/08/orthodox-jews-protest-covid-brooklyn/
[https://perma.cc/M27K-KW8H].
56. See generally Jules L. Coleman, Truth and Objectivity in Law, 1 LEG. THEORY 33 (1995);
DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH (1999); Mark Greenberg, How Facts Make Law, 10 LEG.
THEORY 157 (2004); Connie S. Rosati, Some Puzzles About the Objectivity of Law, 23 L. & PHIL 273
(2004); Brian H. Bix, Reflections on Truth in Law, 8 COSMOS + TAXIS 35 (2020) [hereinafter Reflections].
57. SEE IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 590 (Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood
trans., 1999) (1781) [hereinafter CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON].
58. Rosati, supra note 56, at 303.
59. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).
60. Reflections, supra note 5656, at 38.
61. Rosati, supra note 56, at 282–85.
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and more evocative of religion than science. The result is an implicit reverence
for the doctrine as a coherent body and further, as dogma, even among those
legal scholars who would describe themselves as secular legal positivists (if they
thought about it at all). Even the most secular scholars of positive contract and
corporate law seem to want to find the underlying conceptual structure, as though
there were normative truths or facts in the doctrine analogous to the Standard
Model of particle physics or the general theory of relativity. Modern justification
of rights, the stuff of legal argument, like religion, justifies or condemns action by
derivation of outcomes from authoritative texts.62 As Peter Goodrich observed:
Too often we meet the figure whom Doderidge nicely terms the legal temerist, the
professor in a blind rush to judgment, intent only on proving his point, his worth and so
conforming rather too easily to the almost comical persona of the “authority paradigm”,
the dogmatist who cannot stay to explain in any sustained way why she thinks that
philosophy, theory, hermeneutics, literature or deconstruction or some imagined
spectre bearing that name should be banished, branded, destroyed. As if their opinion
somehow carried an unreal and unreasoned weight. Which, of course, is the problem
with the authority paradigm.63

I turn to my Jewish heritage to illustrate the similarity of doctrinal corpus in
law and religion. Here, unsurprisingly, the practitioners are equally capable of
mistaking their doctrine and practices for truth when applying authoritative text
to circumstances. For instance, shellfish are not kosher, but one of our rabbis
once said, “I don’t think God really cares whether we eat shrimp.” What he
meant was that the central insight was the spark of divinity, of the singularity. In
Judaism, it is a god so abstract that the name in Hebrew is the Tetragrammaton
consisting of the Hebrew letters “Yod, Hay, Vov, Hay” (YHVH), unspeakable
and barely defined (probably something like “I am what I am” or “it is what it
is”). Our rabbi’s implication was that the spark of divinity is what matters, not
the rituals human beings design to remind themselves of that spark on a regular
basis.
Even worse is the corruption of divine ideals when human beings elevate to
the same level of divinity the ritual, the doctrine, and the liturgy that they, not
YHVH, created. What matters is not keeping kosher but infusing daily life with
reminders of the spark of the divine. But when the ritual or the dogma themselves
become divine, disputes over the religious legality of eating shellfish or secular
entitlements resist resolution by discourse, and likely call on one of the
interlocutors to have a conversion experience.64 “If reconciliation is to occur, then
one of us must forsake reason-giving, (non-rationally) reject our old rule, and
(non-rationally) accept a new rule, thereby ending the dispute.”65 Kant observed

62. See Geoffrey Samuel, Interdisciplinarity and the Authority Paradigm: Should Law Be Taken
Seriously By Scientists and Social Scientists? 36 J.L. & SOC’Y 431 (2009) (arguing that law operates under
an “authority paradigm,” where judges make governing assertions free from the normal constraints of
scientific method).
63. Peter Goodrich, Intellection and Indiscipline, 36 J.L. & SOC’Y 460, 477 (2009).
64. Brian Ribeiro, Philosophy and Disagreement, 43 CRÍTICA 3, 6–9 (2011).
65. Id. at 8–9 (citing LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY (Denis Paul & G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., 1969)).
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the same possibility of corruption of rational religion: “The illusion of being able
to accomplish anything in the way of justifying ourselves before God through
religious acts of worship is religious superstition just as the illusion of wishing to
accomplish this by communion with God is religious fanaticism.”66 God really
wants good life-conduct, but “historical faith routinely claims that God’s
judgment is based instead on our doctrinal commitments and liturgical
observances.”67
Even to modern sensibilities, the Jewish mystics can be remarkably
persuasive on the illusiveness of ideal truth, its corruption by human
interpretation, and its replacement by worship of human-made rituals and
artifacts. In the mystic tradition, what Moses heard from God at Sinai, the
seminal Jewish religious moment, was the sound of aleph, the first letter of the
Hebrew alphabet. The ironic insight is that, in Hebrew, the aleph has no sound.68
Rav Avraham Kook, himself a mystic and the chief rabbi of Palestine during the
British Mandate, contended there is spiritual heresy by the corruption of YHVH
as soon as one tries to express YHVH in human terms, even in prayer or ritual.69
My preferred name for God is the Kabbalists’ “Ein Sof,” which means “there is
no end.” It is both the most abstract conception of God in the Kabbalah (a school
of Jewish mysticism) as well as a wry commentary on the human teleological
tendency: “Guess what! For all your sense of ends and purposes, there aren’t any,
or at least none that you can really come to terms with.” From that perspective,
suggesting that you have a right not to wear a mask or get the COVID-19 vaccine
sounds as silly as the notion that God actually cares about eating shrimp.
Jewish tradition is particularly helpful in revealing the commonalities of
religious and legal argumentation because of the Talmud, the great code and
commentary of religious law. The Talmud is the set of tractates in which rabbis
in the first centuries of the Common Era dissected biblical text and applying it to,
among other things, civil issues like torts and contracts.70 One form of Talmudic
argument is called pilpul. Serious treatments consider it to be ”a means to join
each [aspect of Talmudic] Law to its Biblical prooftext.”71 Nevertheless, the logic
can often best be described as hair-splitting. It appears in Harry Kemelman’s

66. IMMANUEL KANT, RELIGION WITHIN THE LIMITS OF REASON ALONE 162 (Theodore M.
Greene & Hoyt H. Hudson trans., Harper & Row 1960) (1793).
67. Lawrence Pasternack & Courtney Fugate, Kant’s Philosophy of Religion, STAN. ENCYCL. PHIL.
§ 3.7.5
(Edward
N.
Zalta
ed.,
2021),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-religion/
[https://perma.cc/6BQC-U93D]; KANT, supra note 66, at 158–59.
68. LAWRENCE KUSHNER, THE RIVER OF LIGHT: SPIRITUALITY, JUDAISM, CONSCIOUSNESS 62
(1995).
69. ABRAHAM ISAAC KOOK, THE LIGHTS OF PENITENCE, THE MORAL PRINCIPLES, LIGHTS OF
HOLINESS, ESSAYS, LETTERS, AND POEMS 261–67 (Ben Zion Bokser trans., 1978).
70. See, e.g., Benjamin Shmueli & Yuval Sinai, Liability Under Uncertain Causation: Four Talmudic
Answers to a Contemporary Tort Dilemma, 30 B.U. INT’L L. J. 449 (2012); Tsureil Rashi & Andrew A.
Schwartz, Contracts Capsized by COVID-19: A Legal and Jewish Ethical Analysis, J. BUS. ETHICS (2021).
71. David Shasha, What is Pilpul, and Why on Earth Should I Care About It? HUFF. POST (May 22,
2010), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/what-is-pilpul-and-why-on_b_507522 [https://perma.cc/QK8LRBYS].
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series of murder mysteries in which David Small, a bookish Conservative rabbi
in a thinly disguised model of Marblehead, Massachusetts, would use his skills as
a Talmudic logician to help the local Irish-Yankee police chief solve murder
cases.72
In one instance, at the end of Kemelman’s Saturday the Rabbi Went Hungry,
a wealthy and religious old man has made a vow to the president of the synagogue
board to fund the addition of a chapel, designed by the president, to the main
structure of the synagogue. The old man dislikes the design but is equally hesitant
not to keep his vow. He asks Rabbi Small for what is in effect a legal
interpretation. The rabbi invokes the rule of shatnes, from the twice-repeated
biblical injunction not to mix linen and wool in clothing. The logic is that the
repetition means that the rule goes beyond cloth and constitutes a rule against
inappropriate mixtures. Since the design of the chapel clashes with the design of
the main building, it is forbidden by the rule of shatnes. The rabbi suggests instead
that the chapel design would be appropriate as a free-standing building in the
synagogue’s cemetery. The old man happily accepts the rationalization, and the
story concludes.73 In another instance, the public address in the synagogue
sanctuary breaks just before Yom Kippur services, and the rabbi argues to the
distraught cantor that singing without the use of electronics was in fact the correct
result under Jewish law.74
That was a benign (and fictional) use of pilpul. In the case of the cantor, the
rabbi’s wife, who has heard the discussion, says with a smile, “That was a terrible
pilpul.” The rabbi agrees but observes that for thousands of years pilpul was a
means of allowing the rabbi to justify what his good sense has already told him
the result should be. Moreover, it “converted into a blessing something that has
to be tolerated anyway. It made him feel pious and devout rather than
aggrieved.”75 But pilpul need not be benign and, in that form, resembles much
legal argumentation about rights. As one commentator observed,
Pilpul occurs any time the speaker is committed to “prove” his point regardless of the
evidence in front of him. The casuistic aspect of this hair-splitting leads to a labyrinthine
form of argument where the speaker blows enough rhetorical smoke to make his
interlocutor submit. Reason is not an issue when pilpul takes over: what counts is the
establishment of a fixed, immutable point that can never truly be disputed.76

It is “the rhetorical means to mark as ‘true’ that which cannot ever be disputed
by rational means.”77
Pilpul is the demonstration that all doctrine, legal or religious, derived from
an authoritative yet unattainable ideal truth is a corruption of that ideal.78 If legal
72.
(1969).
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

HARRY KEMELMAN, SATURDAY THE RABBI WENT HUNGRY, IN WEEKEND WITH THE RABBI
Id. at 365–70.
Id. at 177–78.
Id.
Shasha, supra note 71.
Id.
That may make me sound like a critical legal scholar, which I am most decidedly not, but I am
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argument, like pilpul, traces back to an authoritative text or doctrine, the
advocates’ ascriptions of a kind of divinity to the doctrine, or at least an ideal
doctrinal coherence approaching the divine, make some sense. Such ascriptions
of authoritativeness, if not a quasi-divinity, to doctrine occur regularly and across
legal subject matters. No less an icon than Karl Llewellyn told new law students
eighty years ago that the work of a lawyer or judge in determining the law
proceeds on the assumption “that all the cases everywhere can stand together. It
is unquestionably the assumption you must make, at first. If they can be brought
together, you must bring them.”79 And despite the distinct possibility that rule
application is indeterminate as a matter of pure logic (there is no rule for the
application of a rule),80 there is a strong teleological pull to Dworkinism: that
every problem has a single correct answer in terms of its fit with the prior doctrine
and its justification as a good outcome. One only has to read some of the debates
on the Association of American Law Schools’ contracts listserv over knotty
doctrinal puzzles to see that in practice.
In tenuous cases, legal pilpul, or hairsplitting, can smack of the absurd. But it
can underlie serious academic debate like the one I had with my friend Stephen
Bainbridge over the shareholder wealth maximization principle. That is a concept
that many believe is fundamental to the doctrinal corpus of corporate law, but it
actually decides cases in only the rarest of bizarre circumstances.81 Bainbridge
maintains, axiomatically, that the purpose of the corporation is exclusively for
the benefit of the shareholders. That is a purpose but not the only purpose.
Bainbridge recently called out another scholar’s characterization of a corporation
as a “real entity” as, in Felix Cohen’s famous coinage, transcendental nonsense.82
Even there, the pilpul of our debate justification had an ironic appeal to
metaphysics.83 I did not think the thesis Professor Bainbridge criticized was
not the first to tread this path. See generally Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 4 (1983).
79. K. N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 50 (1960).
80. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 202 (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., 3d ed. Blackwell 2001) (1953); Dennis M. Patterson, Law’s Pragmatism: Law as Practice and
Narrative, 76 VA. L. REV. 937, 943 (1990) (explaining Wittgenstein’s “sceptical paradox”); Linda Ross
Meyer, Between Reason and Power: Experiencing Legal Truth, 67 UNIV. CIN. L. REV. 727, 733–34 (1999)
(discussing how judgment and application of reason to the natural world are “uniquely human
functions”).
81. See Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, The False Dichotomy of Corporate Governance Platitudes, 46 J. CORP.
L. 345 (2021); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Making Sense of the Business Roundtable’s Reversal on Corporate
Purpose, 46 J. CORP. L. 285 (2021) [hereinafter False Dichotomy] (discussing the Business Round Table
and its statement on the purpose of a corporation)].
82. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Corporation is not a Real Entity and to Argue the Contrary is
(Apr.
5,
2021),
“Transcendental
Nonsense”,
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM
https://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2021/04/the-corporation-is-not-a-realentity-and-to-argue-to-the-contrary-is-transcendental-nonsense.html
[https://perma.cc/JKT3-BAM3]
(responding to a piece by Eva Micheler, Company Law - A Real Entity Theory (2021)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3783696 [https://perma.cc/4ZLL-FZFZ]).
83. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Making Sense of the Business Roundtable’s Reversal on Corporate
Purpose, 46 J. CORP. L. 285, 289–90 (2021) (discussing my claims regarding shareholder wealth
maximization).
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nonsensical. I suggested, in response, that one person’s abstract thinking could
be another person’s transcendental nonsense. The Latin root “corp” at the core
of a “corp-oration” is a powerful metaphor for a body and probably did not get
there randomly. As I wrote earlier, “I cannot even refer to the ‘body’ of Delaware
corporate law doctrine without invoking the corpus metaphor that pervades the
thinking of even the most anti-metaphysical proponents of positive law.”84
IV
THE MODERN STATE OF NATURE - WAR BY WAY OF REASON
If it is not already clear, there is some justification for skepticism about
whether resort to modern institutions of rights, like the institution of contract
law, reflects the triumph of civil and reasoned discourse over brute authority.
Locke set down his thesis on the natural rights of man in the last decade of the
seventeenth century, but it only followed Thomas Hobbes’s darker vision by a
matter of some forty years: “this warre of every man against every man” where
“notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have there no place.”85
Reason is never more the slave of the passions than when employed after the fact
to justify actions taken in furtherance of brutish desire. There is no evidence of a
historical watershed after which every hallmark of the state of nature wholly
disappeared or sublimated itself to expressions consistent with reason, civil
discourse, and the rule of law. The world still provides evidence of Hobbes’s state
of nature: the condition that “there be no Propriety, no Dominion, no Mine and
Thine distinct; but onely that to be every mans, that he can get; and for so long,
as he can keep it.”86
The competition between Lockean and Hobbesian conceptions of the world
continues in the gray area practices this Article examines. When it comes to
interpreting the cultural significance of parking space savers, perhaps Lockean
rights and reason have the upper hand over Hobbesian war. Susan Silbey’s point
is that interlocutors undertake the practice and debate its propriety within a
framework of competing property rights—”it’s my labor that created the space,”
versus “it’s public space owned by the city.”
But it is still a gray area. The space savers may feel entitled to any spot that
they can obtain by triumphing over another for the sake of the benefit of the
parking spot to them and the loss to the rest. That is consistent with the equally
compelling and harsher Hobbesian view of human nature as inherently governed
by self-interest:
“[E]very one is governed by his own Reason; and there is nothing he can make use of,
that may not be a help unto him, in preserving his life against his enemyes; It followeth,
that in such a condition, every man has Right to every thing; even to one anothers
body.”87

84.
85.
86.
87.

False Dichotomy, supra note 81, at 369.
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 1, 104 (Christopher Brooke ed., 2017) (1651).
Id. at 105.
Id. at 106.
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Moreover, there is no active and professional mobilization of legal
institutions in connection with parking space savers. The distinct possibility
remains of enforcement of the “right” to the shoveled space through vigilante
justice.88 Compare queuing. It can occur within a recognized system of rights that
operate without a formal legal system. But there is no guarantee that it will, even
in modern societies. “Queuing in an organized fashion is virtually unheard of in
[Israel], where shoppers tend to congregate in an unruly mass next to the counter
each waving the purchases they want in front of the cashier’s eyes.”89 As another
described it, “Israelis do not have the queue-standing gene . . . . They just seem
to stand around in a bunch and then use their elbows to move forward when the
train or bus arrives or when going through a building’s security entrance.”90 Or if
there is a queue, people find their friends and cut in ahead of others (a custom so
prevalent it inspired the term “Israeli queue” for a particular set of priority
algorithms in data processing and operations research).91 As to this taxonomically
blurry practice, Hobbesian war prevails over Lockean reason.
But combining Locke, Hobbes, and the argument from authority gives us the
worst of all possible outcomes. Someone grabs what they want and then
rationalizes the behavior by appeal to the god of rights rather than the biblical
god. The rationalization is no less an instance of reason as slave to the passions
simply because it occurs in 2022 as opposed to 1738 (about the time Hume coined
the phrase).92 The ironic difference between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, to
take Silbey’s point, is the extent to which social practices of everyday life are
infused with rights talk and rights culture that, at least at the margins, come to
resemble religion talk. And the same corruption of the ideal is apparent. What is
a thin theory of liability but another version of pilpul, seeking to justify a
particular practice or outcome by linking it to an authoritative text?
Legal rhetoric, even in mundane disputes, justifies outcomes as just, even
when everyone knows the rhetoric puts ideals and justice in service of
instrumental ends.93 Weaponized reason may be gentler than a gun or a club, but
it is still a weapon capable of misfiring and becoming dogma. As Kant observed,
one need not be a bungler or a sophist to be led astray by reason:
[T]here is a natural and unavoidable dialectic of pure reason . . . that irremediably
attaches to human reason, so that even after we have exposed the mirage it will still not
cease to lead our reason with false hopes, continually propelling it into momentary

88. Silbey, supra note 8, at 82.
(Oct.
6,
2008),
89. Queuing
is
Bad
for
your
Bottom
Line,
ISRAEL21C
https://www.israel21c.org/queuing-is-bad-for-your-bottom-line/ [https://perma.cc/68MQ-L33A]. The
insight about Israeli queuing comes from a story Susan Silbey told me about a trip there in 1973.
90. Marina Shemesh, The Subtle Art of Standing in a Queue in Israel - A Survivor’s Guide, A LETTER
FROM ISRAEL (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.aletterfromisrael.com/2019/12/the-subtle-art-of-standing-inqueue-in.html [https://perma.cc/A3C7-C6CZ].
91. See Nir Perel & Uri Yechiali, The Israeli Queue with Priorities, 29 STOCHASTIC MODELS 353
(2013) (discussing a two-class, single-server, preemptive priority queueing model).
92. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 462 (Ernest C. Mossner ed., 1985) (1739).
93. Gunther Teubner, How the Law Thinks: Toward a Constructivist Epistemology of Law, 23 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 727, 742 (1989).
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aberrations that always need to be removed.94

That is particularly true when reason is the tool by which we justify what we
desire.
Most recently, the outbreak of the Delta variant of the COVID-19 virus
coincided with another outbreak of ironic legal and political pilpul. Vaccination
rates in the “red” states lag the “blue” states by wide margins,95 and outbreaks of
the Delta variant of the virus have been more severe in those states.96 Vaccination
is at least arguably less a matter of social courtesy than mask-wearing. Yet farright politicians and media have made opposition to mandatory vaccinations,
either by governments or private employers, a matter of constitutional and
legislative right.97 “My body, my choice” as an anti-vaccination slogan strikes
proponents of abortion rights as hypocritical; why should one claim the right to
contribute to the spread of a deadly virus on the basis of freedom of bodily
autonomy from government inference when women are not accorded the
equivalent freedom?98 There is no problem being both pro-choice and provaccination nor any inconsistency in holding both views simultaneously. But if
one believes, as a matter of first principles, the unborn child has rights separate
from those of its mother, the avenue for a pilpul justifying the apparent
inconsistency of bodily autonomy becomes clear.
Hence, the normative point is to reduce the ubiquity and fervor of rights talk
not about fundamental human rights but about matters that simply do not
deserve that passion. Indeed, “[i]f the concept of human rights is to be useful, we
must distinguish human rights from the legal rights of particular societies, and
from other desirable social objectives.”99 It means giving up, at least a little, one’s
self-focus and ability to rationalize one’s interest in business transactions and
social interactions. Stewart Macaulay and Lisa Bernstein documented the
intervention of wisdom and practicality in business transactions, going beyond
the mere assertion of contract rights. That may well have no more profound basis
94. CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 57, at 386–87.
95. Katie Adams, States Ranked by Percentage of Population Fully Vaccinated: July 30, BECKER’S
HOSP. REV. (Jul. 30, 2021), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/public-health/states-ranked-bypercentage-of-population-vaccinated-march-15.html [https://perma.cc/MJ4S-CBN2].
96. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, COVID Data Tracker, https://covid.cdc.gov/coviddata-tracker/#county-view?list_select_state=all_states&list_select_county=all_counties&datatype=Risk [https://perma.cc/76ZH-KEEK].
97. Elaine Kamarck, COVID-19 is Crushing Red States. Why Isn’t Trump Turning his Rallies into
(Jul.
29,
2021),
Mass
Vaccination
Sites?
BROOKINGS
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2021/07/29/covid-19-is-crushing-red-states-why-isnt-trumpturning-his-rallies-into-mass-vaccination-sites/ [https://perma.cc/B7CC-4SBU]; Husch Blackwell, 50State Update on Pending Legislation Pertaining to Employer-Mandated Vaccinations, HUSCH
BLACKWELL (Jul. 1, 2021), https://www.huschblackwell.com/newsandinsights/50-state-update-onpending-legislation-pertaining-to-employer-mandated-vaccinations [https://perma.cc/3RG9-43DJ].
98. Molly Jong-Fast, My Body, My Choice? The Paradox of Republican Anti-vaxxers, VOGUE (Jul.
14, 2021), https://www.vogue.com/article/my-body-my-choice-the-paradox-of-republican-anti-vaxxers
[https://perma.cc/PE2W-B8UF].
99. MICHAEL FREEMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 6 (2d ed. 2011)
(emphasis in original).
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than a rational calculation of the long-term costs of holding onto rather than
waiving or renegotiating a right. Nevertheless, the manner in which people cling
even to seemingly immaterial or trivial rights is astounding. As President Obama
observed of the bankers’ insistence on their rights, I have seen business executives
react to crisis by holding fast to contract rights rather than exercise the good sense
to back off. Or what could possibly be so abhorrent about the courtesy of wearing
a mask to protect others from COVID-19 that one resorts to individual freedoms
to justify the refusal?
This is the final irony in the modern reification of rights. President Obama
invoked his Kansas grandmother as a representation of “what a banker was
supposed to be: honest. Prudent. Exacting. Risk-averse. Someone who refused to
cut corners, hated waste and extravagance, lived by the code of delayed
gratification, and was perfectly content to be a little bit boring in how she did
business.”100 Overcoming the power of rationalization requires its own kind of
faith, an affective rather than calculative response. How does someone achieve
that affect? There are aids, but they are more evocative of Gemeinschaft ritual
than Gesellschaft rights. In South Africa, the concept is called ubuntu, the idea
that “you can’t exist as a human being in isolation.”101 Even in a modern
constitutional democracy, the Gemeinschaft sentiment underlies the country’s
Gesellschaft constitutional principles. This sentiment evokes “humanness; social
justice; fairness; the rehabilitation of offenders; the maintenance of law and
order; and recognizing a person’s status as a human being.”102
In Western culture, someone as unlikely as the theologian Martin Buber
proposed a solution that would help even “the leader of a great technical
undertaking” in tempering Gesellschaft rights with Gemeinschaft sentiment.103
Buber called for something called “dialogue,” a check on rationalization and
justification that is the stuff of rights talk. It is, however, an exercise that emanates
more from the heart than the brain:
“It can neither be interpreted nor translated, I can have it neither explained nor
displayed; it is not a what at all, it is said into my very life; it is no experience that can
be remembered independently of the situation, it remains the address of that moment
and cannot be isolated, it remains the question of a questioner and will have its
answer.”104

People can check “this warre of every man against every man” not by
argumentation but by the insight obtained by hearing and accepting what others
say to them. One is not required to satisfy the questioner, but only to hear the
question: “[t]he basic movement of the life of dialogue is the turning towards the

100. OBAMA, supra note 48, at 296–97.
101. Clinton
Foundation,
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2012),
https://stories.clintonfoundation.org/the-spirit-of-ubuntu-6f3814ab8596 [https://perma.cc/T4UL-LQBP].
102. William C. Rhoden, An African Ideal Crosses Borders, Hearts and Minds, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 3,
2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/04/sports/04rhoden.html [https://perma.cc/GAN5-NNTG].
103. MARTIN BUBER, BETWEEN MAN AND MAN 44 (Ronald Gregor-Smith trans., 2002) (1947).
104. Id. at 14.
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other.”105 For all his lyricism, Buber was pragmatic about dialogue. Dialogue is a
relationship in which we hear the questions of another; it is not altruism, and it is
not love.106 Indeed, Buber wanted to be clear it is not about other-worldly
mysticism, but a way of approaching this world. The goal is the quotidian not the
pure break-through.107
This is hardly pie-in-the-sky utopian clamoring for a return to tribal cultures.
I, too, am a creature of the Gesellschaft—a former corporate executive who
teaches business law unapologetically as an honorable pursuit. The point is to call
on some Gemeinschaft wisdom rather than feverish rights talk, particularly when
coping with business and social crisis. Sometimes private individual rights (and
being right) are not all they are cracked up to be.
V
CONCLUSION
Institutions like contract law adapt. Whether they are in crisis likely depends
on the viewpoint of the participant or the observer. A long-time contract law
professor, now told that the year-long six-credit course will be a one-semester
four-credit course, is entirely capable of claiming that contract law is in crisis.
Contracts and contract law largely map on relationships (“smart contracts” being
the thing-like exception that proves the rule), and they are so rarely expressed
(in jurisprudential lingo) as anything resembling the will of the sovereign. For
these reasons, assessing the adaptation of contract law means exploring a
fascinating overlap of law, sociology, philosophy, and politics. If mind-numbing
boilerplate and click-through terms and conditions really offend the body politic,
the institution will adapt either through legislation, common law doctrine, or
custom. The institution does not appear to be in any particularly unusual crisis.
There can be crises of civility, rationality, good sense, and extremism.
Protagonists and antagonists in culture and other wars will undoubtedly call upon
abstractions like contract rights (or their absence) in furtherance of their
passions. It takes teachers and leaders to deconstruct abstract and intangible
conceptions, like contract rights, as palpably real things and to be able to
articulate why either (a) they are not worth asserting, or (b) even if worth
something, they ought not to be asserted.

105. Id. at 25.
106. Id. at 24.
107. Id. at 41.

